Labor Law In Virginia by Laughlin, Charles V.
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 25 | Issue 2 Article 4
Fall 9-1-1986
Labor Law In Virginia
Charles V. Laughlin
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Charles V. Laughlin, Labor Law In Virginia, 25 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 193 (1968),
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol25/iss2/4
LABOR LAW IN VIRGINIA
CHARLES V. LAUGHLIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
It may be said that there is an old labor law (largely obsolete
today) and a new labor law. Labor law courses in a standard law
school in 1928 dealt with a different body of material, and (to a lesser
extent) a different set of problems, than such courses deal with in
1968. The transition was gradual and may be regarded as being started
in 1914 with the enactment of section 6 and 2o of the Clayton Act1
and being accomplished in 1953 when the United States Supreme
Court recognized 2 that the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947
(Taft-Hartley Act)3 had largely excluded the states from the labor law
field. The crucially significant dates for the change, however, may be
considered to be 193 5 , when the original Labor Relations Act (Wagner
Act)4 was enacted, and 1947, when the Labor-Management Relations
Act (Taft-Hartley Act)5 became effective. Between those two dates the
new labor law applied in cases of unions against employers, but the
old labor law was still basically followed in cases of employers against
unions.
Since the enactment of the Labor-Management Relations Act6 in
1947, the standard law school course in labor law (except such intro-
ductory parts as are primarily historical) has been based almost en-
tirely upon the new labor law: federal statutes, United States Supreme
Court and courts of appeals decisions, and decisions and regulations
by the National Labor Relations Board. This is as it should be
*Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. LL.B. 1929, A.B. 193o,
George Washington University; LL.M. 194o, Harvard University; J.S.D. 1942, Uni-
versity of Chicago. Assistance by my student, Mr. Hayward F. Day, Jr., in the
preparation of this article is gratefully acknowledged. Mr. Day's participation was
financed by a Robert E. Lee Research Grant from Washington and Lee University.
138 Stat. 73o (1914).
-Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
329 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1964).
'49 Star. 449 (1935)-
r6i Stat. 136 (1947).
01his statute is commonly known as the Taft-Hartley Act which reenacted
as Title I, with amendments and additions, the National Labor Relations Act of
1935, 49 Stat. 449 (1935). Titles II, III, and IV of the Labor-Management Relations
Act were new. Frequently Title I of that Act is still referred to as the National
Labor Relations Act. Further amendment was made by Title VII, the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griflin Act). 73 Stat.
419 (1959).
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because the great bulk of what may be called labor law is now federal
in nature. The states, however, are not entirely excluded from the
field. No study of the labor law field is complete without some
knowledge of how labor problems are currently handled on the state
level. In order to keep within manageable limits for an article such
as is contemplated here, the labor law of Virginia is used as a point
of focus.
The subject matter of this article is limited to that aspect of law
which governs the relationship between employers and their em-
ployees acting collectively through unions. Not considered are other
types of employee protection such as Workmen's Compensation, laws
limiting the assignment of wages, legislation prescribing safety regula-
tions, and Virginia's statute against black-listing of former employees.-
Prior to the enactment of the Labor Relations Act in 1935 our
labor law was employer-oriented and promulgated primarily on the
state level. It is true that there were several forerunners of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act such as sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton
Act, the Railway Labor Act of 1926, the Norris-La Guardia Act and
the National Industrial Recovery Act. Basically, however, our attempt
to protect the collective bargaining interests of employees dates from
1935. There were many federal labor decisions prior to 1935, but
most of them were in the federal courts by virtue of diversity of
citizenship or because there was an alleged violation of the antitrust
laws. The bulk of the old labor law was developed doctrinally by
state courts.
Wirginia's statute forbidding black-listing provides:
No person doing business in this State, or any agent or attorney of such
person after having discharged any employee from the service of such per-
son or after any employee shall have voluntarily left the service of such
person shall wilfully and maliciously prevent or attempt to prevent by
word or writing, directly or indirectly, such discharged employee or such
employee who has voluntarily left from obtaining employment with any
other person. For violation of this section the offender shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor and shall, on conviction thereof, be fined not less than
one hundred nor more than five hundred dollars. But this section shall
not be construed as prohibiting any person from giving on application
for any other person a truthful statement of the reason for such discharge,
or a truthful statement concerning the character, industry and ability of
such person who has voluntarily left.
VA. CODE ANN. § 40-22 (Repl. Vol. 1953). This section is on the borderline of the
subject here being considered. No case under § 40-22 appears in the annotations
to the Virginia Code. However, I believe that an employer's temptation to deprive
a former employee of working for another employer would usually arise in situa-
tions in which the former employment was terminated as the result of a labor dis-
pute. In format, however, § 40-22 protects individual employees and not employees
collectively or unions.
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The old labor law was employer-oriented in the sense that, for the
most part, rights were vested only upon employers. In Hofeldian
terminology, the law relating to unions was expressed in terms of
duties and privileges. 8 An employer was privileged to bargain col-
lectively with its9 employees, but the law did not require it, i.e. there
was no duty, to do so. Whatever benefits a union might be able to
obtain for the employees would have to be accomplished by the
traditional self-help weapons of strikes, pickets, and boycotts. Labor
law consisted mainly of rules and principles defining the limits of
permissible union self-help. This is still true on the state level in many
states, including Virginia.' 0 In 1935 the National Labor Relations
Act imposed upon employers the duty to recognize and bargain
collectively with such unions as represented the majority of employees
in each bargaining unit. The employees might vote not to be repre-
sented, but the decision was theirs to make. The Act also defined
various practices which were designed to frustrate union membership
and the organization of employees as unfair labor practices.
II. PREEMPTION
The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 imposed only duties
and privileges upon employers. It bestowed rights and powers only
upon employees and their unions. Such rights as employers might en-
joy and such duties as might be imposed upon unions would continue
to be determined after 1935 as they had been before." However, no
state could deprive employees or their unions of any rights protected
by the Federal Act.
In 1947 the Labor-Management Relations Act was enacted. Little
was deleted from the original National Labor Relations Act but
much was added. The additions largely imposed more restrictions
upon unions thereby creating employer rights. For the first time,
a comprehensive federal labor law existed, prescribing rights and
duties to both employers and unions. In 1953 the leading case of
Garner v. Teamsters Local 77612 had the effect of holding that the
8
Compare A. Cox & D. BOK, CASES ON LABOR LAW 1078 (6th ed. 1965).
0The problem is mostly significant with corporate employers.
"Care must be exercised not to carry this generalization too far. Some states
do have statutes comparable to the National Labor Relations Act. Also, the entire
field of labor law was slow to develop in Virginia. It may be an oversimplification
to say that labor law is employer-oriented in this State. See articles cited in notes
36 and 37 infra.
"The antitrust laws were largely eliminated as a source of labor law in 1940
by United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1940).
"346 U.S. 485 (953).
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Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 superceded and eliminated
much of the labor law that had previously been developed and en-
forced on the state level. Thus was established what has been known
as the preemption doctrine. That doctrine has undergone variations
and fluctuations. It was restated and clarified in San Diego Building
Trades Council v. Garmon.13 That case may be considered currently
as establishing the fundamentals of preemption.
It is not the purpose of this article to investigate in depth the
subject of preemption. 14 A bibliography of articles on that topic is
suggested in Cox and Bok, Cases on Labor Law.15 The only leading
article there cited,' 6 subsequent to Garmon, is relied upon consider-
ably in this article.
Section 7 of the Labor-Management Relations Act provides:
. . Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also
have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities
except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as
a condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3).' 7
Section 8(b) of the Act contains a detailed enumeration of acts
which, if performed by a union, are declared to be unfair labor
practices. It contains prohibitions generally similar to those which
had been worked out by the state courts prior to 1947. It is thus
evident that certain conduct is protected by section 7 whereas other
conduct is forbidden by section 8(b). Section 7 expressly protects the
rights of employees to organize into unions and to bargain collectively.
It does not spell out the "other concerted activities" which are also
protected. What these activities are has been determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States, the United States Courts of
Appeals, and by the National Labor Relations Board.
The basic principles of preemption may be stated as follows:
i. No state may deprive any person of a right which is federally
1359 U.S. 236 (1959).
"Originally, the author intended to do no more than mention the existence of
the problem and refer to the leading articles on the subject. It became evident,
however, that somewhat more than that of a treatment of preemption would be
necessary to put the Virginia cases in their proper perspectives.
"A. Cox & D. BOK, supra note 8, at 1077.
10Michelman, State Power to Govern Concerted Employee Activities, 74 Harv.
L. Rev. 641 (ig6s).
1"29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964) (emphasis added).
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protected by section 7 of the Labor-Management Relations Act.
2. No state may invoke state sanctions against most of the acts
which are expressly made unfair labor practices by section 8(b) of
the Labor-Management 'Relations Act.
3. "[W]hen an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the
Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive
competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of
state interference with national policy is to be averted."1 8
4. "The States need not yield jurisdiction to the Federal Govern-
ment where the activity regulated is but a peripheral concern of the
Act or touches local interests so deeply rooted that it cannot be as-
sumed that Congress, absent contrary direction, had deprived States
of power to act."'9
The first of the above enumerated propositions does not invoke
preemption in the truest sense of that term but is based directly upon
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.20 The pre-
emption doctrine is also based upon the Supremacy Clause, but the
clause is broader than the doctrine. In no event may a state promul-
gate a valid law in direct conflict with federal law.2 ' A priori, how-
ever, there is nothing in the Federal Constitution to prevent a state
from promulgating a law which supplements federal policy. It is
only in situations in which the federal government manifests an
intention that its policy shall be uniformly enforced that the states
are preempted from supplementation. Thus, unlike proposition num-
ber one, numbers two and three would not have been true had the
Supreme Court not so declared in cases such as Garner and Garmon.
Proposition number three is based upon the further idea that Congress
might have intended that conduct which could arguably have been
within the prohibitions of section 8(b), but was excluded therefrom,
should be protected under section 7. It is evident from proposition
number four that states are not completely preempted from enforcing
laws which do not conflict with federal policy.22 Under no circum-
stances, however, may a state enact a law which does conflict with
federal law.
'$San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959).
"Linn v. Plant Guard Works Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966). The quotation
is headnote (a) which summarizes 383 U.S. at 59-60.
2U.S. Const. art. VI, para. 2.
"'For example, no state could require the doing of an act forbidden by federal
law, or forbid the doing of an act required by federal law. To forbid the exercise
of a federally protected right would be of a similar nature.
2-This situation is more completely discussed under Part IV of this article,
infra.
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The scope of permissible state action is somewhat broader than
the power of a state to regulate types of conduct which fall outside
the preemption doctrine. In addition, certain categories of employees
and employers are not covered by the Labor-Management Relations
Act. As to such employees and employers the states have the same
power to act as they had prior to 1947. Section 2 of the Labor-Manage-
ment Relations Act 23 limits the categories of employers and employees
subject to or protected by the Act.24 Also, by section 14(c)(1)2 5 Con-
gress authorized the National Labor Relations Board to decline
to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving any class of
employers if the effect of such labor dispute upon interstate com-
merce is minimal.20 Prior to the 1959 Act the Board excluded disputes
involving employers whose operations were primarily local in signifi-
cance. In fact, the standards under which the Board is currently
operating were announced on October 2, 1958.27 These standards
'29 U.S.C. § 152 (1964).
'Section 2(2) provides:
The term "employer"... shall not include the United States or any
wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or
any State or political subdivision thereof, or any corporation or associa-
tion operating a hospital, if no part of the net earnings inures to the
benefit of any private shareholder or individual, or any person subject
to the Railway Labor Act ....
29 U.S.C. § 152 (1964).
Section 2(3) provides:
The term "employee"...shall not include any individual employed
as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or per-
son at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse,
or any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any
individual employed as a supervisor.., or any individual employed ...by
any other person who is not an employer as herein defined.
29 U.S.C. § 152 (1964).
229 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1964). This subsection was introduced by Title VII
of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (the Landrum-
Griffin Act), 73 Stat. 519.
23The exact language of section 14(c)(1) is as follows:
The Board, in its discretion, may, by rule or decision or by published
rules adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act decline to
assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving any class or category
of employers, where, in the opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor
dispute on commerce is not sufficiently substantiated to warrant the ex-
ercise of its jurisdiction: Provided, that the Board shall not decline to
assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute over which it would assert
jurisdiction under the standards prevailing upon August 1, 1959.
29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1964).
'The following list of standards is copied from A. Cox & D. BOK, supra note
8, at 1087-88, with permission of the copyright owner:
"NOTE-The current tests by which the NLRB decides whether to exercise its
jurisdiction were outlined in an NLRB press release dated October 2, 1958 (R-5 7 6).
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are expressed in terms of the nature and size of the employers in-
volved, rather than in the statutory terms of the size of the particular
dispute.28 In addition, the Board has declined jurisdiction over certain
other employers.
29
By express statutory provision,3 0 the states are allowed to assert
The tests are as follows:
1. Non-retail Firms: All such firms with an annual outflow or inflow, direct
or indirect, in excess of $S5o,ooo.
2. Office Buildings: All such buildings with a gross annual revenue of $1oo,ooo,
provided that at least $25,ooo is derived from organizations which would
fall under NLRB jurisdiction under any of the new standards.
3. Retail Concerns: All such concerns doing $S500,OOO or more gross volume
of business.
4. Instrumentalities, Links and Channels of Interstate Commerce (trucking
companies, etc.): All such entities which derive $5o,ooo or more annually
from the interstate (or linkage) portion of their operations, or from services
performed for employers in commerce.
5- Public Utilities: All utilities which have at least $250,oon gross annual
volume or qualify under the jurisdictional standard applicable to non-
retail firms.
6. Transit Systems (other than taxicabs, which are governed by the standard
for retail concerns): All such systems with an annual gross volume of
$250,000 or more.
7. Newspapers and Communications Systems: Radio, television, telegraph and
telephone systems: Siooooo gross volume. Newspapers: $200,ooo gross
volume.
8. National Defense: All firms having a "substantial impact on national
defense."
9. Business in the Territories and District of Columbia: District of Columbia:
Plenary. Territories: The normal jurisdictional standards will apply.
lo. Associations: Associations will be regarded as a single employer for juris-
dictorial purposes.
In addition to the standards set forth above, the NLRB has sometimes declined
to take jurisdiction over certain limited occupations or activities, such as horse
racing, amusement parks and most private hospitals."28See also NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, JURISDICTIONAL GUIDE. On page
4 of this manual it is stated: "[I]n applying those standards, the Board considers
the total operations of the employer, even though the particular labor dispute
involves only a portion of those operations..." These standards, of course, were
promulgated prior to the statutory authorization of 1959. The statute does not
permit the Board to restrict further its jurisdiction. For that reason, the Board
may have considered it prudent not to change the format of its jurisdictional
standards.
3A. Cox & D. BoK, supra note 8, at io88 states: "In addition to the standards
set forth above, the NLRB has sometimes declined to take jurisdiction over
certain limited occupations or activities such as horse racing, amusement parks
and most private hospitals."
The Board's JURIsDICTIONAL GUIDE, supra note 28 states: "Acting pursuant to
Section 14(c)(1) the Board has determined that it will not assert jurisdiction over
proprietory hospitals, race track enterprises, owners, breeders and trainers of race
horses, and real estate brokers."
3DSection 16(c)(2) provides:
Nothing in this act shall be deemed to prevent or bar any agency or
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jurisdiction over labor disputes over which the Board declines jurisdic-
tion. This was not true prior to 1959. In Guss v. Utah Labor Relations
Board,31 the Supreme Court held that the states were preempted even
though the case fell outside the category of disputes which the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board would consider.32 Guss created a so-called
"no man's land" which was abolished by the Landrum-Griffin Act.33
There are three bases upon which states are not preempted by
the Labor-Management Relations Act from regulating labor disputes.
(i) States are not precluded from handling cases involving employers
and employees who are excluded by sections 2(2) and 2(3) of the
Act. (2) States are free to act (so far as the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act is concerned) in matters involving employers who fall short
of the jurisdictional standards promulgated by the Labor Relations
Board pursuant to the power granted in section 14(c)(1) of the Act. (3)
Some types of labor disputes are not preempted by the Federal Act and,
thus, states are free to act regarding all personnel, even those not
covered by categories (i) and (2). Such types of conduct are those
which are neither protected by section 7 nor arguably forbidden by
section 8 or those which are of but peripheral concern to the Act and
touch deeply rooted local interests. This third category may be re-
ferred to as "Non-Preempted Fields" and is discussed in Part IV,
infra. Categories (1) and (2) are called "Preempted Fields" and are
discussed in Part V, infra.
The more important of the excluded categories of persons not
covered by the Labor-Management Relations Act are: public em-
ployees, independent contractors, supervisors, hospitals and their
employees, and farm employees.34 It might appear that activities and
the courts of any State or Territory (including the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands), from assuming and asserting
jurisdiction over labor disputes over which the Board declines, pursuant
to paragraph (i) of this subsection, to assert jurisdiction.
29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(2) (1964).
3353 U.S. 1 (1957).
-'Guss is also interesting in two other respects. Most preemption cases deal
with proscribing judicial action on the state level. In Guss it was administrative
action, similar in nature to the type of action taken by the Board, which was
preempted. Also, the preemption doctrine is usually thought of as one which
prevents the states from invoking sanctions against unions and favorable to em-
ployers. In Guss the converse situation was involved. Guss therefore demonstrates
that there is no double standard as regards preemption. Neither of these two
aspects of Guss is especially significant in Virginia. In this State labor matters
are still handled through the judicial process. Also, Virginia's labor law is pri-
marily restrictive of unions rather than employers.
"A. Cox & D. BoK, supra note 8, at 1092.
3 For a discussion of those excluded categories see. A. Cox & D. BOK, supra note
8, at 143-57. I am not unmindful that also excluded are employees of the Federal
200
1968] LABOR LAW IN VIRGINIA 201
problems normally associated with labor disputes would not be found
in the case of independent contractors. However, many small-time
operators, such as newsboys, fishermen, trappers, and insurance agents,
are on the borderline of what might be called "employees" or what
might be called "independent contractors." 35 Such groups might even
have what they call a "union" with a charter from the AFL-CIO. If
they are independent contractors, however, such so-called "unions"
are really small-time trade associations. If these independent con-
tractors, acting through their "unions," engage in any activity of a
type normally performed by unions representing employees, regula-
don of such activity is obviously not preempted by the Federal Labor
Act. The states are therefore free to regulate such activity subject
to other constitutional limitations such as the free speech doctrine
in case of peaceful picketing.
III. SANCTIONS
A. In General
Suppose that an employer has a demand or cause of action against
its employees or a union; what are its remedies? The same question
Government and its wholly owned corporations, and employees subject to the
Railway Labor Act. These are not important, however, so far as state power,
the subject matter of this article, is concerned. The Federal Government would
not invoke state sanctions in case of disputes with its employees. I believe that
the elaborate provisions for arbitration in the Railway Labor Act, see H. NORTHRUP,
CoMPuLsoRY ARBITRATION AND GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN LABOR DIsPUTES 51-82,
particularly 63-64 (1966), prevent the states from invoking state sanctions in most
cases of disputes involving personnel subject to the Act. The cases of Railway
Employes, Department, AFL v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956), and Slocum v.
Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 339 U.S. 239 (1950), may be regarded as applying the
preemption doctrine to labor disputes subject to the Railway Labor Act. The
same statement may be made regarding Lee v. Virginian Ry., 197 Va. 291, 89 S.E.2d
78 (1955), and Moore v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 198 Va. 273, 93 S.E.2d 140 (1956).
mSee NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254 (1968); United States
v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944);
Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143 (1942); NLRB v. Steinberg,
182 F.2d 850 ( 5th Cir. 1950); Walling v. American Needlecrafts, Inc., 139 F.2d
6o (6th Cir. 1943); Kansas City Star Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 384 (1948). One must always
consider the possibility of regarding any manual worker as an employee. In Farin-
holt v. Luckhard, go Va. 936, 21 S.E. 817 (1886), it was held that an independent
contractor, a mail deliverer, was a "laboring person" within the scope of the
homestead exemption. There is considerable logic to the view that the labor act is
designed to protect non-affluent people who do manual labor, whether technically
employees or independent contractors. Clearly a "laboring person" under the
homestead exemption laws is not the same as an "employee" under § 2(3). How-
ever, the possibility that the court might rely upon Farinholt in a close case
must not be overlooked.
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could be raised in the converse situation; what are the remedies of
employees and unions against employers? As previously explained,
that situation is less likely to arise in Virginia. There may be some
challenge to the proposition herein previously postulated: that tradi-
tional labor law in Virginia is employer-oriented. Two learned articles
have been written upon this subject since 1946. John C. Parker, Jr.,
Esquire, in Current Trends in Labor Law in Virginia,36 pointed out
that there has been almost no traditional labor law in this state.
Virginia has, until recently, been a rural state, with little industry,
so there has been little occasion for developing that branch of law
known as labor law. A tremendous change occurred in the ten years
following Mr. Parker's article. In 1956, Arnold Schlossberg, Esquire,
pointed out 37 that in the ten years covered by his article (1946-1956)
there had been more labor law promulgated in Virginia than in the
entire history of the state prior to 1946. This throws somewhat into
question my previous premise that Virginia is rooted in tradition so
far as labor law is concerned. Mr. Schlossberg takes the position that
Virginia's statutory developments have been as favorable to organized
labor as they have been unfavorable.
The subject of sanctions relates both to preempted and non-pre-
empted fields. The difference is that any employer may apply its
state remedy against any employee or union in a non-preempted
situation. If the conduct involved falls within the application of the
preemption doctrine state remedies can only be invoked against, or
on behalf of, those employees and employers excluded from coverage
by the Federal Act by its subsections 2(2) and 2(3) or pursuant to
subsections t4(c)(1) and 14(c)(2).
Remedies available in Virginia fall basically into four categories:
(1) self-help, (2) criminal sanctions, (3) civil (usually damage) suits,
and (4) injunctions. The last three are judicial remedies. There are
five 38 pertinent statutes in Virginia regulating labor relations. They
relate to picketing,39 strikes by public employees, 40 Virginia's Right-
to-Work Law,41 the prohibition of a limited type of featherbedding,
42
'32 VA. L. Rrv. 1050 (1946).
rSchlossberg, Current Trends in Labor Law in Virginia, 42 VA. L. REV. 691
(1956). Mr. Schlossberg acknowledges the identity of the title of his article with
that written by Mr. Parker ten years earlier. Mr. Schlossberg refers to "borrowing"
the title and gives full credit to Mr. Parker.
"'Or six, if § 40-22, the black-listing statute, be included. See note 7 supra.
"VA. CODE ANN. § 40-64 (Repl. Vol. 1953).
'OVA. CODE ANN. §§ 40-65 to -67 (Repl. Vol. 1953).
4VA. CODE ANN. §§ 40-68 to -74 (Repl. Vol. 1953).
4-VA. CoDE ANN. § 40-64.1 (Supp. 1966).
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and the requirement that unions register.4 3 The remedies available
in each of the five statutes are shown in the following table:
Table I
Criminal Damage
Self-Help Sanctions Suits Injunctions
Picketing § 40-64 no yes no yes
Strikes by
Public Employees §§ 40-65 to -67 yes no no no
Right-to-Work §§ 40-68 to -74 no yes yes yes
Some featherbedding
forbidden § 4o-64.1 no yes no no
Unions required to
register, §§ 40-95.7, -95.8 no yes no no
Appendix I is a table classifying all Virginia labor law cases
(or Federal cases involving Virginia law) according to the remedy
sought.44
B. Self-Help
Many demands by either party against the other are best enforced
by self-help. The economic weapons available to employees and
unions are the strike, the picket, and the boycott. The employer's
power to lock out corresponds to the union's power to strike; but
the more forceful employer self-help sanction is its power to dis-
charge or otherwise discipline its employees. That weapon is, of
course, only available against employees, not against unions or
strangers.
It appears from Table I that the only remedy provided to the
state, or any of its municipalities or subdivisions, for an unlawful
strike by its public employees is a form of self-help: the power to
discharge said employees. They are not eligible for reemployment
as a public employee for one year.
As previously explained, self-help is almost the only method in
Virginia by which employees or unions can protect their interests
regarding wages, hours, conditions of employment, or collective bar-
gaining, against employers.4 5 Labor law in Virginia, as was tradi-
'EVA. CODE ANN. §§ 40-95.7 to -95.8 (Supp. 1966).
"Citation for each case is given at the point in this article at which that
case is principally used. The "Note" reference after the case name indicates the
footnote or footnotes of this article which are relevant to said case.
,'This is true, of course, only in labor relations law in the strict sense in
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tionally true everywhere, is principally concerned with defining the
permissible limits of strikes, pickets, and boycotts.
The employer's most effective self-help weapon, its power to dis-
charge or otherwise discipline, is obviously effective only against indi-
vidual employees. If an employer covered by the Labor Act seeks to
invoke that weapon against an employee also covered by the Act,
there is always the danger of a violation of sections 8(a)(1) or 8(a)(3)
of the Federal Labor-Management Relations Act. The lockout would
be effective only against employees as a group. Against strangers or
unions the employer's principal protection is in statutes or doctrines
placing limitations upon the union's right to strike, to picket, or to
boycott.
C. Criminal Sanctions
The earliest legal mechanism by which labor disputes were con-
trolled was the criminal action. Crump v. Commonwealth46 is an
early Virginia case in which a successful criminal prosecution was
based upon what was then an illegal secondary boycott.47 The de-
fendant's conduct was characterized as a "criminal conspiracy." This
is not, however, to be confused with the historical criminal conspiracy
doctrine4s which made the very formation of a union a criminal
offense. This doctrine is said to have withered away after 1842.49
The main body of labor law in the states is not to be found in
criminal statutes or decisions. There are instances, however, in which
labor disputes are the subject matter of criminal prosecutions. From
Table I it is seen that four of Virginia's leading labor law statutes
provide for criminal sanctions. From Appendix I it is seen that six
criminal cases involving labor disputes have been before the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals.
D. Civil Suits
After criminal prosecutions ceased to be principally relied upon
which it is being discussed in this article. There are many laws designed to
protect employees which are enforced through judicial or other governmental
sanctions. Note, in particular, that an act of an employer in black-listing a prior
employee, in violation of § 40-22, is subject to criminal penalties. See note 7
supra.
'184 Va. 927, 6 S.E. 620 (1888).
17This case is also considered under Secondary Boycotts. Note 131 infra. The
facts of the case are more fully stated at that point.
"See A. Cox & D. BOK, supra note 8, at 22.
"The celebrated case of Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) i ii
(1842), was decided in that year. The case could only apply to Massachusetts courts,
but the prestige of Chief Justice Shaw together with the political climate of the
times may have had their effect.
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in labor cases, resort was had to the damage suit. At one time labor
law came to be regarded as a phase of tort law. Since unions were
normally not incorporated, the actions were against individual union
leaders or members who were charged with tortious activity. Many of
the celebrated labor cases involved damage suits against individuals.
The inadequacy, from a financial point of view, of the damage suit
against an individual is readily apparent. One of the earliest successful
attempts to sue a union as an entity was made in the English case
of Taft Vale Railway Company v. Amalgamated Society of Railway
Ser ants.5o Considerable political protest arose over the Taft Vale
decision and the doctrine of that case was repealed in England by
the Trade Disputes Act of 19 o6.51 Even though the principle of the
Taft Vale decision was rejected in England, it was followed by the
United States Supreme Court in United Mine Workers v. Coronado
Coal Company.52 Real success in enabling unions to sue and be sued
as entities, however, came through legislation. Many states now permit
suits by and against unions. Likewise such suits are permitted by
sections 3o1 and 303 of the Labor-Management Relations Act.
58
Section 8-66 of the Virginia Code permits unincorporated associa-
tions, including unions, to sue and be sued as entities.54
u0[i9oi ] A.C. 426.
nSee J. LANDIS & M[. MANOFF, LABOR LAW 26, (1942). The first chapter is
entitled Historical Introduction and is an excellent historical survey of our labor
law.
F259 U.S. 344, 39o (1922).
'.29 U.S.C. §§ 185, 187 (1964). These two sections are considered in consider-
able detail infra.
"All unincorporated associations or orders may sue and be sued under
the name by which they are commonly known and called, or under which
they do business, and judgments and executions against any such associa-
tion or order shall bind its real and personal property in like manner
as if it were incorporated. Process against such association or order or
notice to it may be served on any officer or trustee, director, staff member
or agent of such association or order.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8-66 (Supp. 1966).
In Railway Employees Department of AFL v. Virginian Railway, 39 F. Supp.
354 (E.D. Va. 1941), § 8-66 was applied in a suit by a union against a company
to compel arbitration of a labor dispute. A problem arose in International Brother-
hood of Boilermakers v. Wood, 162 Va. 517, 175 S.E. 24 (1934). In that case an
employee, member of the defendant union, sued the union for alleged insurance
benefits. There was apparently no national officer or agent upon whom service
could be obtained. It was held that service could not be obtained against an
officer of the local. To aid in the problem there presented, the legislature in
1962 enacted § 8-66.1, to provide that, in case no officers or agents of the corpora-
tion be in the State, service might be obtained upon the clerk of the State
Corporation Commission, VA. CODE ANN. § 8-66.1 (Supp. 1966). In Yonce v. Miners
Memorial, 161 F. Supp. 178 (W.D. Va. 1958), it was held that three non-resident
trustees of a fund created for the benefit of employees did not constitute an
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The leading case in Virginia involving a tort action for damages
is United Construction Workers v. Laburnum. 5 In that case the
company was severely injured in its business by threats of violence
by the union in an organizational recognition campaign. In La-
burnum, an unfair labor practice under section 8 (b) of the Labor-
Management Relations Act was clearly shown by the evidence. Not-
withstanding the preemption doctrine, the Virginia decision in
plaintiff's favor was sustained by the United States Supreme Court,
upon two grounds: (i) violence; and (2) that the remedy sought in
Laburnum was not available in a Labor Board proceeding. After
Laburnum it was believed that the preemption doctrine applied only
to state injunction and not to damage suits until the contrary was
held in Garmon.5 6 Laburnum seems not to have been filed under
any of Virginia's labor law statutes. Therefore, an employer may be
regarded as having a common law right to damages against a union
which injures its business by violence or threats of violence.
The damage suit is an expressly authorized remedy in only one
of Virginia's five pertinent statutes.57 As Laburnum shows, however,
such a common law remedy may be available. Of the 15 civil suits
referred to in Appendix I, only one involves a suit by an employer
against a union based upon traditional labor law principles.5s
E. Injunctions
From the 18go's until 1932 the injunction was the legal sanction
most frequently used in labor dispute cases. This did not meet en-
tirely with public favor for a variety of reasons. The most funda-
mental objection to the injunction was that chancellors did not have
the background to understand properly the dynamics of a labor
association so as to be served under § 8-66.1. For an exposition of problems pre-
sented by an earlier attempt to make a union amenable to service when it had
no officers or agents within the state (§ 40-74.4) see Schlossberg, supra note 37,
at 698.
5194 Va. 872, 75 S.E.2d 694 (953), afJ'd, 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
r359 U.S. 236 (1959). This is the leading preemption case. See note 18 supra.
57See Table I.
5Not otherwise mentioned in this article are two successive appeals in a
suit by a member against her union for breach of an agreement to indemnify her
for loss of employment due to her union membership. Kiser v. Amalgamated Cloth-
ing Workers, 169 Va. 574, 194 S.E. 727 (1938); Amalgamated Clothing Workers v.
Kiser, 174 Va. 229, 6 S.E.2d 562 (1940). It was held to be within the power of
the union to make the agreement, but not within the scope of the authority of
the specific officer of the union. This case is well discussed in Parker, Current
Trends in Labor Law in Virginia, 32 VA. L. REv. 1050, 1055 (1946). A later case
which reaches the same conclusion as the second Kiser appeal regarding indemnifica-
tion agreements by union officers is United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Moore,
2o6 Va. 6, 141 S.E.2d 729 (1965).
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dispute. The check of jury trial, available in both criminal prosecu-
tions and damage suits, did not obtain in equity cases. In 1932, the
Norris-LaGuardia Act59 so drastically curtailed the use of injunctions
in labor dispute cases as almost to eliminate that remedy in the
federal courts. Approximately twenty states have enacted similar
anti-injunction statutes, 60 but the state courts have generally been
more lenient in their interpretation and application of the anti-in-
junction statutes than have the federal courts. A majority of the
states, including Virginia and several of the leading industrial states,
have no such legislation.
The injunction was recognized early in Virginia as a remedy
against non-peaceful picketing in Everett Waddey Company v. Rich-
mond Typographical Union.61 Today, injunctive relief is expressly
authorized by legislation in connection with the statute regulating
picketing 62 and the Right-to Work Law.63 It is evident from Appendix
I that six cases have involved injunctive relief. Only three of these
were cases by an employer against a union.
IV. NON-PREEMPTED FIELDS
This section deals with those types of labor disputes in which
state agencies (or a federal court in a diversity case) may apply state
statutory or decisional law, irrespective of the fact that the National
Labor Relations Board might also invoke the sanctions provided by
the National Labor Relations Act.64 The matters here discussed
apply to all personnel, irrespective of whether or not they are of
the categories of persons that are covered by the Labor Act.
A. Federal Causes of Action in State Courts
Herein considered are causes of action arising under sections 301
and 303 of the Labor-Management Relations Act.65 Both sections
r'47 Stat. 70 (1932).
cCommonly known as "Little Norris-LaGuardia Acts."
6io5 Va. 188, 53 S.E. 273 (19o6). Actually, it was found in that case that the
evidence did not establish the defendant's connection with whatever violence
there might have been, so a temporary injunction was dissolved and a permanent
injunction denied. The language in the case is instructive, however. The case is
a significant injunction case because a temporary injunction usually served the
employer's purpose even though a final injunction might be denied.
6VA. CODE ANN. § 40-64 (Repl. Vol. 1953).
"'VA. CODE ANN. § 40-74.3 (Supp. 1966).
"It must be remembered, of course, that in no situation may a state deprive
a party of a right guaranteed by the Federal Act.
5"29 U.S.C. §§ 185, 187 (1964).
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provide for court actions. Section 3ol gives either an employer, union,
or employee 60 a cause of action for violation of any collective agree-
ment made between an employer and a union under the National
Labor Relations Act. Section 303 gives a cause of action for damages
to any person injured in his business or property by a secondary
boycott or other conduct violative of section 8(b)( 4 ) of the Labor Act.
Under both sections a union may sue or be sued as an entity. Suits
may be filed in either a federal or a state court.67 However, only
federal, and not state, law is to be applied irrespective of which court
entertains the action.68 There is no difficulty with the preemption
doctrine, because federal law is applied. Pearman v. Industrial Rayon
Corporation9 is a Virginia case squarely on point. The preemption
doctrine prevents the application of state law, whether in a state court
or a federal court. 70 It is the law to be applied that determines the
question of preemption not the tribunal in which it is applied.
Strictly speaking, the reference here made to sections 3o and 303
is irrelevant to the subject matter of this article. These sections do
not involve Virginia labor law but federal labor law susceptible of
application in the courts of Virginia. These sections are brought in
to round out the picture because they involve the type of problem
which interests a Virginia labor lawyer. The only Virginia case
involving either sections 3O or 303, of which this writer knows, is
"Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962), extends the right to sue
to individual employees especially if the union refuses to bring suit. Accord.
Pearman v. Industrial Rayon Corp., 207 Va. 854, 153 S.E.2d 227 (1967).
6"Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
16Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
05207 Va. 854, 153 S.E.2d 227 (1967). In this case the contention was squarely
presented that plaintiff's case could only be maintained in a federal court. That
argument was rejected. The court's opinion thoroughly summarizes the pertinent
federal cases. The preemption argument was also made and rejected in Smith v.
Evening News Ass'n, 371 U. S. 195 (1962).
7ONormally federal courts apply state law in diversity cases. In a case covered
by the Labor Act, federal courts are preempted from applying state law the same
as are state courts.
"12o7 Va. 854, 153 S.E.2d 227 (1967). See notes 66 & 69 supra. United Con-
struction Workers v. Haislip Baking Co., 223 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1955), is a case
from Virginia which was brought in a federal district court under § 301. It
was held that neither a national union or its local was liable for a wildcat strike
alleged to have been in violaion of a collective bargaining agreement. This would
seem sound when the nature of such a strike is considered. This case is not con-
sidered when the statement is made that only one case is found under § 301.
Haislip is neither in a Virginia court nor based upon Virginia law. The recent
case of Williams v. Chesapeake Bay Bridge, 208 Va. 714, 16o S.E.2d 573 (1968),
is clasiffied in the official reports under the heading of "Labor Relations." That
case involves only an employee's suit for pay. It was not brought under a § 301
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Pearman.71 Section 303 is pertinent on the subject of secondary boy-
cotts and is discussed under Part V (C) of this article.
There are two interesting questions in this area: (i) whether a Vir-
ginia court may grant injunctive relief in a case under section 30l
of the Labor Act,7 2 and (2) if so, whether an injunction can be pre-
vented by the defendant union by removing the case to a federal
court under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). 73 The answer to
the first question is probably affirmative. Since April 8, 1968, the
answer to the second question has been affirmative.
These problems, regarding the availability of injunctive relief in
a section 301 case, originate in the United States Supreme Court
decision in Sinclair Refining Company v. Atkinson.7 4 In that case
a divided court held that suits under section 301 are subject to the
limitations of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and that, thus, injunctive
relief in a federal court is not available.75 In McCarroll v. Los Angeles
County District Council of Carpenters76 the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia was presented with the question whether a state court, in a
state which has no anti-injunction statute, might grant an injunction
in a section 3Ol case. At that time it had not yet been determined by
the Supreme Court whether injunctive relief would be available in
a federal court. However, the California court proceeded upon the
assumption that it would not be. A divided California court held
that it was bound by federal substantive law but might apply its own
remedies. It was therefore held that injunctive relief might be given.
Since Virginia has no anti-injunction law, by following McCarroll,
collective agreement but under a contract between an employer and its financial
underwriter.
7-Clearly no injunction is available under § 3 because that section expressly
provides that an injured party may recover "the damages by him sustained."
"Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction found-
ed on a claim or right arising under the constitution, treaties or laws of the
United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship and residence
of the parties." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1964).
"'37o U.S. 195 (1962).
77The Supreme Court may have weakened a bit in the recent case of Inter-
national Longshoremen, Local 1291 v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n, 389 U.S.
64 (1967). In that case a trial court order, which might have been regarded as
an injunction, was struck down on the ground that it violated federal rule 65(d),
which requires that all injunctions be definite. The majority of the court made
no reference to Atkinson or the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Justices Brennan and
Douglas made it clear, in their concurring opinion, that they were not reaffirming
Atkinson. 389 U.S. at 76, 77. Also, three members of the Supreme Court in their
concurring opinion in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, IAM, 39o U.S. 557 (1968),
see note 79 infra, made it clear that they regarded the "continuing validity"
of Atkinson as open for further consideration.
7049 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957).
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such relief might be made available in this state in a section 301 case.
The question then arises whether, if a section 3o case is filed in
a state with no anti-injunction law, injunctive relief might be pre-
vented by the defendant union removing the case to a federal court,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 14 4 1(b), thus bringing it under the limita-
tions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Prior to April 8, 1968, the answer
to this question was in doubt. In American Dredging Company v.
Local 25, AFL-CIO 7 the court of appeals refused to permit the re-
moval. The court of appeals reasoned that the federal courts have
no jurisdiction because of the limitation in the Norris-LaGuardia Act
that "no court of the United States ... shall have jurisdiction to issue
any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a
case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except in strict
conformity with the provisions of this Act...." Since, in the court's
opinion, a federal court has no jurisdiction of the case, removal could
not be accomplished.
78
Since April 8, 1968, the power of a Virginia court to grant an
injunction in a section 301 case has become illusory. On that date,
the United States Supreme Court held in Avco Corporation v. Aero
Lodge 735, 1AM 79 that a section 301 case, commenced in a state court,
might be removed to a United States district court under 28 U.S.C.
§ 14 4 1(b). Being then in a federal court injunctive relief would be
prevented. In Avco a suit was filed in a Tennessee state court under
section 301 to enjoin a strike upon the allegation that it was in viola-
tion of a no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement. The
state court granted an injunction ex parte. The defendant removed
the case to the United States district court which dissolved the tempor-
ary injunction. That action was upheld, but the court refused to
pass upon whether the Norris-LaGuardia anti-injunction act required
the federal court to dissolve a temporary injunction previously
granted by a state court.
1338 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 935 (1965).
-8The case is commented upon adversely in 22 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 255
(1965). With all due respect, the author believes that the American Dredging Co.
decision is clearly wrong. The court's confusion resulted from the unfortunate use
of the term "jurisdiction." The concept of jurisdiction is usually thought of as
involving a court's power to consider a particular type of case. Here, it is used
to refer to the court's inability to give a particular type of relief. Clearly, federal
courts have jurisdiction over § 3o cases. An injunction case removed from a
state court should be no different in a federal court than one filed there initially.
The court should have recognized the removal and either dismissed the case with-
out prejudice or have awarded damages in lieu of an injunction.
'990 U.S. 557 (1968).
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B. Peripheral Torts
It was recognized in Garmon8 o and more recently in Linn v.
United Plant Guard Workers, Local 11481 that certain activity of a
peripheral nature may be regulated by the states even though the
same acts would constitute a violation of section 8 of the Labor Act.
s 2
The idea is that well-established categories of crime or tort may be-
come involved incidentally in a labor dispute.
Labor law, in its purest form, deals with a clash between two
distinctively economic interests: the interest of society in optimum
production of economic goods and services and the sometimes compet-
ing social interest in the preservation of human resources by assuring
a beneficial distribution of what has been produceds3 This thought
has been expressed by the late Mr. Justice Holmes:
One of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made up
is that between the effort of every man to get the most he can
for his services, and that of society, disguised under the name
of capital, to get his services for the least possible return.
8 4
It is the resolution of this conflict that provides the underlying back-
ground for our labor law.
Society has other interests in addition to those which compete in
the labor law arena. Especially important is the social interest in
general security.8 5 It is this interest that forms a large portion of our
traditional criminal and tort law. One of these other important social
interests might become incidentally involved in a labor dispute.
For example, a homicide would be none the less so if committed
as part of a labor controversy. The idea is that the other interest
might be so important that procedure could be either through tradi-
tional channels or through the statutes applicable to labor disputes.
Theoretically, it is only in the case of conduct involving a clash be-
tween distinctively labor law interests that the preemption doctrine
is applicable. However, until recently this peripheral tort theory was
'359 U.S. 236 (1959).
111383 U.S. 53 (1966) •
'For a concise statement of this principle see the quotation from a headnote
in Linn at note 19 supra.
sFor a table of the more important social interests see E. PATTERSON, MEN
AND IDEAS OF THE LAW 523 (1953). The contest in labor dispute cases is between
category V(a), "social interest in economic progress," and IV(b), "social interest
in preservation of human resources."
84Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1o77, 1o8, (1896) (dissenting
opinion).
rSee E. PATTERSON, supra note 83, at 523.
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applied only in cases involving non-peaceful acts. Recently a limited
application of this theory has been made in a libel case.8 6
C. Non-Peaceful Conduct
The term "non-peaceful" is used instead of the term "violent"
in order to avoid a purely semantic argument in certain borderline
situations such as mass picketing, obstruction, or name-calling. No
definite rule can be made to govern all such cases, but the decision
in each case should not turn upon whether or not the conduct
involved falls within the category of "violence."
The premise may be accepted that state agencies may invoke state
sanctions against some types of non-peaceful conduct, even though
the acts involved also constitute a violation of the Labor Act.8 7 One
of the leading cases exempting non-peaceful conduct (violence and
threats of violence) from the preemption doctrine is the Virginia
case of Laburnum.88 Only damages were sought and obtained in that
case. It is pointed out 89 that between 1953 and 1959 it was believed
that the case also had the effect of eliminating all damage suits from
the scope of the preemption doctrine.
So far as non-peaceful conduct is associated with picketing, the
first two paragraphs of the Virginia Code, section 4o-64,90 are relevant.
No person shall singly or in concert with others interfere
or attempt to interfere with, another in the exercise of his
right to work9l or to enter upon the performance of any law-
ful vocation by the act of force, threats of violence or intimida-
tion, or by the use of insulting or threatening language directed
toward such person, to induce or attempt to induce him to
quit his employment or refrain from seeking employment.
No person shall engage in picketing by force or violence,
or picket alone or in concert with others in such manner as to
obstruct or interfere with free ingress or egress to and from
'Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966). The
Court was divided. The majority made it clear that not all instances of libel in
connection with a labor dispute would remove that dispute from the preemption
doctrine. "[W]e therefore limit the availability of state remedies for libel to those
instances in which the complainant can show that the defamatory statements were
circulated with malice and caused him damage." 383 U.S. at 64-65.
'See Michieman, State Power to Govern Concerted Employee Activities, 74
HARV. L. REV. 641, 664-66 (ig6i).
'194 Va. 872, 75 S.E.2d 694 (1953), aft'd, 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
89Note 55 supra.
"°Section 40-64 is primarily a picketing statute and is considered in its en-
tirety under picketing in part V(B) infra, see note 123 infra, and Appendix II.
"Although the expression "right to work" is here used, Schlossberg points out
that this section should not be confused with the true right-to-work law. Schloss-
berg, Current Trends in Labor Law in Virginia, 42 VA. L. REV. 691, 693 (1956).
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any premises, or obstruct or interfere with free use of public
streets, sidewalks or other public way.
92
So far as is pertinent here, the remainder of the section provides
for criminal sanctions and for injunctive relief.
Virginia's leading case under these paragraphs is McWhorter v.
Commonwealth.9 In that case a strike was in process at a garment
manufacturing company in Roanoke, Virginia. Defendant, Grace
McWhorter, was an employee, although she had been employed for
only a short time and, unknown to the company, was a "plant." Not
all of the employees joined the strike. Picketing was instituted and
led by the defendant. No actual physical injury occurred, and ingress
and egress to the plant was not denied to non-striking employees.
However, loud screeching noises were made and abusive and obscene
epithets were used. For example, a song was sung with the refrain:
"When the roll is called up yonder, will you whores be there?" The
abuse was such that one non-striking employee fainted. A conviction
for violating section 40-64 was upheld. The case presents a border-
line situation. The conduct invoked could be called "non-peaceful"
although not actually violent. The court indicated that rough langu-
age is permissible so long as it is directed toward persuasion. When
it becomes coercive, it no longer falls within the free speech protec-
tion.
Paragraph two, § 40-64, was involved in Hubbard v. Common-
wealth.94 Defendant, with her two companions, lay down in front
of one of the main entrances to a large industrial plant in such a
manner as to block completely the use of the gate by both pedestrian
and vehicular traffic. Her conviction for violating both § 18.1-173,
prohibiting trespass, and paragraph two § 4o-64, was upheld. This
case arose in connection with a race and not a labor dispute and is
thus, strictly speaking, not within the scope of this article. It is here
included, however, because it does involve the interpretation and
application of a statute primarily applicable to labor disputes and the
case also involves a type of conduct usually associated with labor
disputes.
In cases of non-peaceful conduct there is frequently 'the problem
of union responsibility. In United Brotherhood of Carpenters v.
Humphreys,95 an employee was allowed to recover for extreme in-
juries resulting from unquestionable violence. The only issue was as
ONA. CODE ANN. § 4o-64 (Rep1. Vol. 1953).
Mi9i Va. 857, 63 S.E.2d 2o (195).
4207 Va. 673, 252 S.E.2d 750 (1967).
w-03 Va. 781, 127 S.E.2d 98 (1962).
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to the union's responsibility. The local was having trouble getting
a contract and the National Union sent two field representatives to
aid. A strike and picketing followed. Plaintiff participated in the strike
and picketing for a considerable time but eventually announced his
intention to return to work. One of the union's field representatives
suggested at a meeting that all apostate strikers be "entertained" on
their way back and forth to work. That was held sufficient to convict
both the national and local union for the assault upon plaintiff.9
The court found no trouble in distinguishing United Construction
Workers v. Haislip Baking Company.
97
D. Right-to-Work
The term "right-to-work" law is somewhat of a misnomer.0 s It
does not guarantee anyone a job, but forbids even the extremely
limited union shop agreement permitted by section 8(a)(3) of the
Labor-Management Relations Act.99 The power of a state to enact
such a statute is expressly excluded from the preemption principle
by section 14 (b) of the Act.
100 Approximately twenty states, mostly
in the South, have such statutes.
Virginia's Right-to-Work Law is found in the Virginia Code,
sections 40-68 to 40-74.101 An inspection of that statute indicates that
it not only outlaws the union shop, but also anti-union (the so-called
yellow dog) contracts. The making of such a contract is illegal. It
is also illegal to use any form of pressure, even though peaceful, to
coerce any party to enter into a forbidden contract. All three types
of sanctions (criminal, damage suits, and injunctions) are provided
for violations of this law.
The applicability of the Right-to-Work Law may depend upon
10"A field representative of an international labor organization engaged in
union organizational activities, negotiations of contracts, and settling grievances
between employers and members of local unions, which are mere divisions of
the international union, is engaged in the business of both the international and
local unions so as to render both responsible for acts done by him within the
scope and course of his employment...." Id. at 787.
'223 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1955). For a statement of the case see note 71 supra.
OSee Schlossberg, Current Trends in Labor Law in Virginia, 42 VA. L. REv.
691, 694 (1956)-
,29 U.S.C. § s58(a)(3) (1964).
110Id. § 164(b). The Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 153(i) (1964), has expressly
permitted the union shop notwithstanding any state law to the contrary. Thus,
it was held in Moore v. C. & 0. Ry., 198 Va. 273, 93 S.E.2d 140 (1956), that non-
union employees subject to the Railway Labor Act could not enjoin the enforce-
ment of a union shop agreement.
'OVA. CODE ANN. §§ 40-68 to -74.1 (Repl. Vol. 1953, Supp. 1966), see Appendix
1968 ]  LABOR LAW IN VIRGINIA 215
the situation in which it is invoked. If an employer, relying upon
an illegal union shop agreement, discharges a non-union employee,
no great problem is presented. Such a case was Finney v. Hawkins.
0 2
The only contention made by defendant was as to the consitutionality
of the statute. The injured employee recovered a judgment for dam-
ages against both his employer and the union.
A more difficult problem arises in cases in which picketing is
engaged in for the alleged purpose of compelling an employer to
employ only union men or to enter into an illegal union shop agree-
ment. The two cases of Painters and Paperhangers Local Union No.
xoi8, A. F. of L. v. Rountree Corporation.0 3 and Local io, Journey-
men Plumbers v. Graham04 may be compared in this regard. Both
cases involved suits for an injunction. In both cases sub-contractors
employing only union men and open shop sub-contractors were in-
volved on the same construction project. The union put a peaceful
picket around the premises which was honored by the employees of
the all-union sub-contractors. In both cases the placards carried by
the pickets merely announced that non-union men were employed
on the premises. The only difference in the cases seems to be that
in Rountree no demand was made that non-union employees be
discharged, whereas such a demand was made in Graham. The Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals denied the injunction in Rountree
whereas the United States Supreme Court upheld it in Graham.
The difference in the two cases seems to be in what the court
believed to be the union's purpose in its picketing. In Rountree the
court accepted the union's contention that it was merely conducting
an organizational picket. By its very terms the Act makes it clear that
peaceful persuasion of employees to join the union is not forbidden.105
In Graham, the union's demand that all non-union employees be
replaced was accepted as evidence that the union's purpose in con-
ducting the picket was to compel the employer to violate the Right-
to-Work Law. 100
'mi89 Va. 878, 54 S.E.2d 872 (1948). For an excellent explanation of this case
see Schlossberg, supra note 91, at 696.
10194 Va. 148, 72 S.E.2d 402 (1952).
1"345 U.S. 192 (953). There is no Virginia reported opinion in the case be-
cause petition for writ of error was denied by the Supreme Court of Appeals. The
constitutionality of the Right-to-Work Law was also upheld in Graham.
"VA. CODE ANN. § 40-74.2 (Supp. 1966), see Appendix II.
16In his excellent article, note 91 supra, at 703-o6, Mr. Schlossberg raises the
question whether the United States Supreme Court today would find the picket in
Graham bad because of its purpose. He relies upon Weber v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955), and a statement by Professor Cox to the effect that the
preemption doctrine forbids any state to proscribe union conduct because of
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E. "Unprotected" Conduct
Reference is here made to conduct neither protected by the Labor-
Management Relations Act nor arguably prohibited by that enact-
ment.107 Of course, it seems evident that either party would be free
to use self-help or to resort to any available state law remedies in the
event the other engages in "unprotected" conduct.
It is difficult to think of many types of activity, involved in labor
disputes, that would fall within this category of "unprotected" con-
duct. The writer agrees with Michelman's conclusion that strikes, or
other concerted activity, for the purpose of compelling an employer
to perform an illegal act would be unprotected. 10s It also seems clear
that a strike which is expressly forbidden by federal law, such as a
mutiny at sea,' 09 would fall within this category.
F. Harassment
By this term is meant concerted activities engaged in by employees
while they are in a pay status. 1 0 An example may be found in conduct
its purpose. The so-called illegal purpose doctrine is discussed primarily in Part
V(D) infra. It is there pointed out that there are two versions of that doctrine.
What Weber and Professor Cox rule out is the objectives test in its broader
aspect: the condemning of certain purposes as being beyond the scope of proper
labor objectives. In Graham, the union's purpose, as construed by the Court,
was to compel the plaintiff to do an act which he could not legally do. This is
the illegal purpose doctrine in its narrow sense.
In another respect Mr. Schlossberg has cleared up a problem that has long
troubled me. In both Rountree and Graham the sub-contractor whose employees
instituted the picket employed only union men. How was that possible under the
Right-to-Work Law? At page 700 of the Schlossberg article it is brought out that
there is much de facto circumvention of the Right-to-Work Law by willing and
cooperative unions and employers.
"'This term "unprotected" conduct is borrowed from Michelman, State Power
to Govern Concerted Employee Activities, 74 HARv. L. REV. 641, 658 (1961). Michel-
man uses the quotation marks, which are necessary because the designation is not
strictly accurate. Conduct which is not protected but is forbidden or arguably
forbidden would literally fall within the designation of unprotected conduct but
is not the sort of thing that is here being considered. The writer has borrowed
Michelman's terminology because of his inability to think of a better short
designation.
"'°Michelman, supra note 107, at 670-72. An example may be found in Ameri-
can News Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 1302 (1944). In that case, the union struck to compel
the employer to immediately put into effect an agreed-upon pay increase. At that
time such an increase in wages could not legally be made until approved by the
War Labor Board.
10 Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942). The Supreme Court in this
case was divided five to four. However, the case is complicated by the fact that the
strike was because of an unfair labor practice.
110By section 2(3) of the Labor Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3), employees do not
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involving a series of short, intermittent strikes. Such conduct was held
to be unprotected in International Union, Local 232 V. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board,"'i commonly called the "Briggs and
Stratton" case. In that case it was held that state sanctions might
be invoked. The same problem would be involved, however, if the
employer had sought to exercise its self-help right of discharge.
Similar harassing tactics were held not to be a violation of the Labor
Act in NLRB v. Insurance Agents' International Union." 2 Disloyalty
to an employer, while still in a pay status, is also an example of a
harassing tactic regarded as unprotected." 3 The idea of these decisions
seems to be that while drawing the employer's pay its employees
owe it a high degree of loyalty and obedience. The concerted activities
contemplated by section 7 of the Labor Act are those which involve
a temporary cessation of work and pay.
In Virginia there are no official sanctions available to an employer
as a protection against harassing tactics by his employees. Its remedy is
to exercise its self-help power of discharge or other disciplinary action.
It would not be guilty of an unfair labor practice under the Federal
Act by doing so."
4
V. Preempted Fields
Under this heading is considered conduct which is protected,
prohibited, or arguably prohibited by the Federal Act. There may
still be some Virginia law relative to such conduct, but it can only be
applied in cases involving employers or employees not covered by
the Labor Act." 5 The most important are public employees, hospitals
and their employees, supervisors, unionized workers technically con-
sidered independent contractors, farm workers, and (perhaps most
important) employees in enterprises which fail to meet the Labor
Board's jurisdictional standards. It must not be assumed that the
lose their status as such by striking. However, they are not in a pay status while
on strike.
2336 U.S. 245 (1949)-
"361 U.S. 477 (1960).
' 3NLRB v. Local 1229, IBEW, 346 U.S. 464 (953). Here the employees dis-
paraged the employer's product but did not actually strike. This case is com-
monly called the "Jefferson Standard" case.
UOf course an employer's power to make rules and enforce discipline in
its establishment goes beyond its remedy for harassing tactics. So far as the Labor
Act is concerned, an employee may be disciplined for any reason except belonging
to a union, participating in strike activities, or engaging in other protected con-
duct. A wholly arbitrary discharge of an employee, for a reason other than some
conduct protected by the Labor Act (such as the employee's religious affiliation),
would not violate the Labor Act but it would likely violate a collective bargaining
agreement, most of which limit discipline to "just cause."
2"See notes 23 to 35 supra.
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state can make and enforce any labor law it chooses regarding such
persons. There are various other constitutional limitations upon
state action, such as the free speech doctrine. The point is that the
Labor-Management Relations Act does not bar state action where
such employers and employees are concerned.
A. Strikes
The strike is probably the most fundamental tool of labor's power
of self-help. For over ioo years it has been recognized as generally
legal. This is subject to the limitation that some types of strikes are
forbidden,116 and to limitations sometimes asserted regarding the
purpose for which a particular strike is called. 117 The general legality
of the strike has been recognized in Virginia.1 8 It has been held,
however, that a union representative has no authority to bind the
union to indemnify members for losses suffered during a strike.119
The only type of strike expressly prohibited by current Virginia
law, so far as this writer is aware, are strikes by public employees.
120
The only sanction available in case of a strike by public employees
is discharge and ineligibility for public employment for twelve months.
No published decisions appear in the annotations to this statute.
B. Peaceful Picketing
As early as 19o6 peaceful picketing was recognized as legal in Vir-
ginia in Everett Waddey.' 2' This is quite remarkable because in the
United States generally peaceful picketing was not accepted until
much later. In 1940 in the leading case of Thornhill v. Alabama,
122
peaceful picketing was declared to be a form of constitutionally pro-
tected freedom of speech and entirely free from legislative or judicial
restraint. Soon after Thornhill was decided, however, the United States
Supreme Court recognized that even peaceful picketing is not merely
'See notes io8 and 1o9 supra.
"'See Part V(E) infra.
u8Everett Waddey Co. v. Richmond Typographical Union, 1o5 Va. 188, 5 3 S.E.
273 (1906).
'"United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Moore, 206 Va. 6, 141 S.E.2d 729 (1965).
'2VA. CODE ANN. §§ 40-66, -67 (Repl. Vol. 1953). (See Appendix II) It is seen
in Part VI, infra, that strikes by utility employees are curtailed. It must be
remembered that no strike forbidden by federal law would be legal in Virginia.
The nature of our doctrinal (i.e. common) law is such that a judicial decision
could announce a limitation upon strikes as though such limitations had always
existed.
I1-1o5 Va. 188, 53 S.E.2d 273 (i9o6).
'-31o U.S. 88 (1940).
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a matter of free speech but might be a coercive weapon of the type
normally subject to regulation by our labor law. Thus, a long series
of decisions restricted much of the original Thornhill doctrine. These
decisions are summarized in the majority and dissenting opinions in
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 695, v. Vogt, In-
corporated.123 It was held there that Wisconsin might forbid a peace-
ful picket by non-employees designed to induce an employer to per-
suade its employees to join the union, contrary to the state law giving
them a freedom of choice. This is known as the organizational picket.
Vogt makes it clear that the free speech doctrine is not completely
abandoned and that not all peaceful pickets may be forbidden by
state action.
Virginia's only attempt to curtail legislatively peaceful picketing
is found in the third paragraph of the Virginia Code, section 40-64.
This was first enacted in 1946 but significantly amended in 1952. The
section as originally enacted and as amended, is as follows:
[It shall be unlawful for any] When a strike or lockout is
in process no person who is not, or immediately prior to the
time of the commencement of any strike or lockout was not,
a bona fide employee of the business or industry being picketed
[to] shall participate in any picketing or any picketing activity
with respect to such strike or lockout [or such business or in-
dustry].124
Both criminal sanctions and injunctive relief are provided by section
40-64. Paragraph three was intended to forbid what has been called
stranger picketing, i.e., picketing by non-employees. The most usual
instance of stranger picketing is called organizational picketing, which
deals with a situation in which a union is attempting to organize the
employees of an employer. It is usually found where the employees
have been offered an opportunity to join the union, and select it as
their bargaining representative, but have declined to do so.
By interesting coincidence, the case destined to test paragraph
three, section 40-64, as originally drafted in 1946, was not one in-
volving organizational picketing, but a case completely outside the field
of labor law. Defendants in Edwards v. Commonwealth 25 were
Negroes who were prosecuted under the criminal provisions of section
2"354 U.S. 284 (1957).
"'Material in brackets was in the 1946 version of this statute but was deleted
in 1952. Material italicized was added in 1952. Section 40-64 relates to both non-
preempted conduct (violent picketing) and to preempted conduct (peaceful picket-
ing). For the relationship of this statute to non-peaceful picketing see notes 86
to 88 supra.
'--gi Va. 272, 6o S.E.2d 9G6 (1950).
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40-64 because they picketed a theater which did not employ a Negro
manager. The picketing was peaceful and ingress and egress of patrons
was not disturbed. It was held that the statute, in this situation,
violated the principle of free speech and thus could not be enforced.
In its decision in Edwards, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
may not have understood the extent to which the Thornhill doctrine
had eroded. Even so, Edwards could well be supported as involving
a true free speech situation even after the Supreme Court's decision
in Vogt. 126 It seems as though the Virginia legislature misconstrued
the scope of the decision in Edwards when it amended the section
in 1952. True, paragraph three was held completely unconstitutional,
but that was because it forbade all stranger picketing irrespective of
the circumstances. The decision in Edwards does not preclude the
reenactment of paragraph three so as to forbid organizational picket-
ing. In fact, that was exactly the type of enactment upheld in Vogt,
which had not yet been decided when Edwards was before the Vir-
ginia court.
After the decision in Edwards, the legislature did not amend
paragraph three, section 40-64, so as to be limited to organizational
picketing. Instead, it amended paragraph three so as to apply only
in cases in which a strike or lockout is in process. As thus changed,
the Supreme Court of Appeals upheld paragraph three in Dougherty
v. Commonwealth. 27 The legislative change saved the constitution-
ality of the section. However, it altered the original purpose for
which the paragraph was passed. Organizational picketing is quite
controversial. There is authority upon both sides. It is now con-
siderably curtailed by section 8(b)( 7 ) of the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act. Organizational picketing exists when there is no dispute
between an employer and his own employees and no strike is in
process. On the other hand, there is little historical precedent, and
no substantial policy, to forbid non-employees from helping em-
ployees in their picketing in cases in which a genuine strike is in
process.
The entire issue of paragraph three, section 40-64, and the Edwards
and Dougherty cases, turned out to be of less consequence than origi-
nally thought. In Waxman v. Virginia,128 it was held that paragraph
three falls within the preemption doctrine. A conviction thereunder
was therefore reversed. Waxman would seem to be clearly correct.
'-"Note 123 supra.
-"-i99 Va. 515, 1oo S.E.2d 754 (1957).
'371 U.S. 4, rev'g Waxman v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 257, 123 S.E.2d 381
(1962).
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The entire subject of organization picketing is now covered by sec-
tion 8(b)(7) of the Labor-Management Relations Act.129 Paragraph
three of section 40-64 now applies only to those personnel not covered
by the Labor Act. In this regard it is unlike the first two paragraphs
which deal with non-peaceful conduct and thus apply to all personnel.
Difficulty, as regards preemption, is presented by the type of con-
duct involved in Hubbard.130 Defendant lay in the entrance to an
industrial plant and thus prevented ingress and egress. As in Edwards,
a race, and not a labor, dispute was involved in Hubbard. So, there
is no actual problem of preemption in regard to that case. Suppose
that -the same conduct were involved in connection with a labor dis-
pute. Would this conduct be responsible for coercing employees not
to exercise their right to enter and work, and thus be a violation of
§ 8(b)(i) of the Labor-Management Relations Act? Likely. But would
the fact that defendants were also found guilty of the peripheral
offense of trespass, in violation of a non-labor law statute of Virginia,
retain concurrent jurisdiction in Virginia's courts over defendants'
conduct? It is at least so arguable. The freedom of speech problem is
not so obvious in Hubbard as in Edwards because in Edwards there
was no obstruction.
C. Secondary Boycotts
The only Virginia case, known to this writer, involving the second-
ary boycott is the early case of Crump.13 The defendants in that case
were members of a typographical union who sought to influence
Baughman Brothers, a printing establishment, to employ only union
printers. For that purpose they sent circulars to all of Baughman
Brothers' customers asking them to cease patronizing Baughman
Brothers and threatening to boycott them if they did not comply
with the request. It was held that the defendants had committed a
criminal offense.
132
Today it is very clear that all types of secondary boycott activity
involving employers and employees who are subject to the Labor
Relations Act can be handled only under that Act. 33 Thus, the
1229 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1964). This section was not yet in effect at the time
section 40-64 was enacted or amended, or when Edwards and Dougherty were
decided. However, that circumstance does not bar the applicability of the pre-
emption doctrine.
230207 Va. 673, 152 S.E.2d 250 (1967).
2184 Va. 927, 6 S.E. 62o (1888).
'I'he court used the term "criminal conspiracy." This must not be confused,
however, with the earlier criminal conspiracy doctrine in which the mere
establishment of a union was regarded as a criminal offense.
""See note 18 supra.
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doctrine of Crump, even if it is still the law of Virginia, can be
applied only in cases of employers and employees who are not subject
to the Federal Act. In this connection, however, it must be remem-
bered that a party injured by secondary boycott activity, violative of
the Federal Act,'8 4 may maintain an action for damages in either a
federal or state court. 135 The case, however, must be decided under
federal law (statutes and decisions) and not under state law.
There is still the problem of secondary boycotts under Virginia
law regarding those employers and employees not subject to the Labor-
Management Relations Act. The law has never been clear or explicit
as to exactly what categories of conduct may be regarded as consti-
tuting illegal secondary boycotts. There is only the one precedent in
Virginia. The purpose of a rule (whether statutory or court-made)
against secondary boycotts is to confine a labor dispute to the parties
primarily involved and not permit it to spread to persons whose
position would logically make them neutral. It is here suggested that,
if confronted by an alleged secondary boycott involving employers
and employees not subject to the act, a Virginia court might apply the
pertinent provisions of the Federal Act by analogy.' 3 6
D. Interference with Contractual Relations
One of the doctrines of tort law which was part of the old labor
law was that inducing a breach of contract is tortious, unless justi-
fied.137 In 1917 the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals applied this
principle in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Vickers.13s It was
held that a declaration which sought damages by an employee against
a union upon the theory that the union had caused plaintiff's
employer to break its contract with plaintiff stated a cause of action.
Unfortunately, the facts of the case do not appear in the opinion,
"ASpecifically, Labor-Management Relations Act, § 8(b)(4 ), 29 U.S.C. § i5 8(b)(4)
(1964), which forbids jurisdictional strikes as well as certain types of secondary
boycotts.
I'See Part IV(A) supra. The action is for damages under § 3o3 of the Labor-
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1964).
"'See note 134 supra.
"'tSee C. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 93-95 (2d ed. 1958, Supp. g6i); C.
GREGORY 8- H. KATZ, LABOR LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTS 117-125 (1948).
The leading tort case is Lumley v. Gye, ns8 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853). The leading
labor law case applying the Lumley doctrine is South Wales Miners' Federation
v. Glamorgan Coal Co., [19o5] A.C. 239. The most extreme application of this
doctrine is found in Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917),
in which the Supreme Court upheld a decree enjoining a labor organizer from
inducing employees to break their anti-union (so-called "yellow-dog") contracts.
121 Va. 311, 93 S.E. 577 (1917).
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most of which is devoted to procedural questions not here material.
If a union causes an employer (not subject to the Railway Labor Act)
to discharge an employee because of non-membership in the union,
a violation of Virginia's Right-to-Work Law.139 has occurred. If a
union induces employees to strike in violation of their collective
agreement, the remedy of an employer subject to the Federal Labor
Act is under section 301 of that Act.140 If a union induces one com-
pany to break its contract with another company, the remedy of an
employer subject to the Federal Act is a complaint to the Labor
Board or an action under section 303.141 In the last two situations
an employer not subject to the Labor-Management Relations Act
might predicate a cause of action upon the general principle under-
lying Vickers.
142
E. Forbidden Union Objectives
One of the established principles of the old labor law was that
otherwise legitimate union conduct (such as a strike or peaceful
picket) would become illegal if the court regarded the union's ob-
jective as being outside the realm of legitimate union concern. This
principle has been variously referred to as the unlawful purpose
doctrine, the prima facie tort doctrine, or the objectives test. A lead-
ing case is Plant v. Woods143 in which a strike to compel the employer
to enter a union shop agreement was held to be illegal. A fairly
recent application of the doctrine is found in Opera on Tour, In-
corporated v. Weber.144 It was there held that a strike for the purpose
of preventing an employer from replacing employees with machines
was an improper labor objective, and therefore illegal.145
This unlawful purpose doctrine was recognized, by way of dicta,
2VA. CODE ANN. §§ 40-68 to -74 (Repl. Vol. 1953). See Part IV(C) supra and
Appendix II.
'0See Part IV(A) supra.
'-Id. The complaint with the Labor Board would be based upon § 8(b)(4).
See note 134 supra.
1121 Va. 311, 93 S.E. 577 (1917). It is obvious that the case is not strictly in
point. 'In Vickers the suit was by an employee against a union. That case, there-
fore, would be only analagous to a case involving a suit by a company against a
union.
1"176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1Oli (19oo).
1"285 N.Y. 348, 34 N.E.2d 349 (1941).
"1'Injunctive relief was upheld, even though New York has an anti-injunction
statute. It was regarded that the improper objective took the case outside the
concept of a "labor dispute." The illegal purpose doctrine is more a part of the
old labor law than the new labor law. However, between 1935 and 1947 the old
labor law still applied to cases of employers against unions. See Part I supra.
The illegal purpose -principle is retained, to some extent, in § 8(b)(4) of the
Labor-Management Relations Act.
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in the Virginia case of Everett Waddey.146 The object of the strike
in that case was to obtain an adjustment of working hours. Such a
purpose is clearly legitimate. Since the union's picketing was peace-
ful, a temporary injunction was dissolved and a permanent injunction
refused. However, the court did recognize that the objectives test
would be applied in an appropriate case.
There is not one, but two, objectives tests. In its broad sense,
the doctrine enables courts to pass upon the legitimacy of union
purposes. In that sense, there is little manifestation of the objectives
test in the new labor law,147 except where certain objectives have been
legislatively forbidden, as by section 8(b)( 4 ) of the Labor-Management
Relations Act. The concept of improper union ends, however, has
a narrower application. Sometimes a union engages in concerted
activity for the purpose of compelling an employer to take action
it cannot legally take. Such a case is American News Co.148 The union
in that case struck to compel the immediate activation of an agreed-
upon wage increase. At that time such a wage increase could not
be put into effect lawfully until approved by the War Labor Board.
Such a strike was unprotected. The Board discussed the objectives
test in both its broader and narrower aspects.
Mr. Arnold Schlossberg takes the position that the preemption
doctrine now forbids states from applying the objectives test to parties
covered by the Labor Relations Act.149 Mr. Schlossberg cites,' 50 with
approval, a statement made by Professor Archibald Coxx15 to the
same effect. This is undoubtedly a sound conclusion so far as the
broader objectives test is concerned. Since the Labor Act has legis-
latively forbidden concerted activities for some specified objectives,
it is clearly inferable that Congress intended that other objectives
be regarded as legitimate. 52 Thus, a Virginia court could forbid
concerted union activities because it disapproved of the union ob-
jectives only if the dispute was between parties not covered by the
Federal Act.
14105 Va. 188, 198, 53 S.E. 273 (1906).
14 But see NLRB v. Reynolds Int'l Pen Co., 162 F.2d 68o (7 th Cir. 1947), in
which a strike in protest against disciplinary action of a foreman was considered
to be for an improper objective and thus not protected.
1855 N.L.R.B. 1302 (1944).
"'Schlossberg, Current Trends in Labor Law in Virginia, 42 VA. L. REv. 691,
703-o6 (1956).
20Id. at 704.
luCox, Federal Preemption of the Law of Labor Relations, NEw YORK UNI-
VERSITY, SEVENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR, PROCEEDINGS 1, 8 (1954).
'-Compare Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 478, 479 (1955), which
is relied upon in the Schlossberg article.
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The Schlossberg article raises the question 5 3 as to whether Gra-
ham154 would be decided the same way by the United States Supreme
Court if it were to arise today. The difficulty lies in the fact that the
Supreme Court upheld the injunction against the picketing because
the purpose thereof was to compel the employer to violate the Right-
to-Work Law. It is submitted here that a recognition of this difficulty
overlooks the distinction between the broad and narrow versions of
the objectives test. It would seem anomolous if concerted activities
directed toward compelling a violation of law would be protected
against state action. Michelman' 55 takes the position that state agen-
cies are not preempted from prohibiting union activity designed to
compel an employer to do an act which is forbidden by any federal
law.15 6 The same conclusion would seem to apply to union activity
designed to force an employer to perform an act forbidden by a valid
state enactment.157 It is the opinion of this writer that Virginia may
enjoin, even in regard to parties subject to the Federal Act, concerted
activities intended to coerce an employer into violating a valid federal
or state law, such as the Right-to-Work Law.
V. Regulation of Unions
Most of the few restrictions imposed by Virginia's legislature upon
labor unions have been aimed as assimilating unions to the status of
corporations so far as responsibility is concerned. It is seen that the
Virginia Code, section 8-66, permits a union to sue and be sued as
an entity.15 8 In line with the juristic personality thus conferred upon
2Schlossberg, supra note 149, at 705-06.
'r4345 U.S. 192 (1953)- See Part IV(C) supra, in which Graham is compared
with Painters Local ioi8 v. Rountree Corp., 194 Va. 148, 72 S.E.2d 402 (1952).
1I5Michelman, State Power to Govern Concerted Employee Activities, 74 HARV.
L. REV. 641 (1961).
-'Id. at 670-72. This statement applies to conduct designed to compel an
employer to violate the Labor-Management Relations Act or any other federal
statute. This must not be confused with union conduct which is merely an unfair
labor practice under the Labor-Management Relations Act, but which is not
resorted to for the purpose of compelling the employer to violate that Act.
1Compare Fur Workers Local 72 v. Fur Workers Union, 1o5 F.2d i (D.C.
Cir. 1939), aff'd. mer., 3o8 U.S. 522 (1939). In that case, a minority union picketed to
compel an employer to recognize it. Such recognition would -have been an unfair
labor practice by the employer because another union unquestionably represented
the majority of the employees. The court, however, denied injunctive relief be-
cause of the limitations of the Norris-La Guardia Act. The specific conduct in-
volved would now constitute a violation of the Labor Act, § 8(b)(4). However, so
far as known to this writer, the Supreme Court does not recognize an exception
to the anti-injunction act of cases in which concerted activities are designed to
compel a violation of law.
VPart III(D) supra.
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unions is section 40-63 which permits unions to own, encumber, and
sell real estate.159 Other Code sections aimed at imposing responsi-
bility upon unions are 40-95.7160 and 40-95.8161 (passed in 1966) re-
quiring unions to register. This registration requirement might be
compared in purpose to the requirement that a corporation qualify
to do business within the state. It also is intended as a protection to
workers from being solicited for membership and dues by unauthorized
individuals. The section further supplements Code 40-74.4 regarding
service of process upon a union.1
02
There may appear to be a question regarding the constitutionality
of Virginia's union registration law. In Thomas v. Collins0 3 the
United States Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a Texas
statute requiring that all union organizers obtain an organizer's card
before soliciting members for his organization. The statute was held
to constitute a violation of freedom of speech. The whole context of
Thomas makes is clear that the Texas legislature was concerned with
a control of union solicitation before it occurred. Such is not the
case under the Virginia Code, sections 40-95.7 and 40-95.8. These
sections do not forbid a union from doing business within the State.
They merely provide that if the union does do business, it must
register. There being no prior restraint, it is difficult to see how
freedom of speech could be involved.
A question also arises whether sections 40-95.7 and 40-95.8 can
be sustained in regard to personnel covered by the Labor-Manage-
ment Relations Act, i.e. whether those sections are subject to the
preemption doctrine.1 4 It may be that the purposes of the Virginia
sections fall within the category of matters of peripheral concern
exempted from federal preemption. However, section 7 of the Federal
Labor Act permits employees to join unions. Can it be said, there-
fore, that the state may place even so mild a restraint upon the power
'OVA. CODE ANNN. § 40-63 (Supp. 1966), see Appendix II.
"OVA. CODE ANN. § 40-95.7 (Supp. 1966), see Appendix II.
20WVA. CODE ANN. § 40-95.8 (Supp. 1966), see Appendix II.
"N-A. CODE ANN. § 40-74.4 (Supp. 1966). Section 40-74.4 requires a labor organi-
zation, which has no officers or agents within the state, to file with the Department
of Labor and Industry and the State Corporation Commission a written power
of attorney appointing the clerk of the State Corporation Commission an agent
for purposes of service. Mr. Schlossberg has pointed out that § 40-74.4 is of little
consequence because national unions usually operate through their locals in this
state. Schlossberg, supra note 148, at 698. Section 40-95.7 is useful as establishing
a record of the registered agent for a local union for purposes of service of
process.
153323 U.S. 5P6 (1945).
IOnly freedom of speech was considered in Thomas v. Collins, since when
that case was decided in 1944 the preemption doctrine was not yet effective.
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to unionize as to require registration? Certainly, an employer must
bargain with the union selected by -the majority of its employees.
This writer is of the opinion that it would be no defense to a charge
of refusal to bargain that the union had failed to register as required
by sections 40-95-7 and 40-95.8.
Code of Virginia, section 4o-64.11c5 forbids a type of featherbedding.
During -the 1950's most automobiles were shipped from the point of
production to the point of sale by highway carriers. In the ig6o's
railroads sought and obtained part of that business. Highway trans-
portation was required for part of the trip, even though the ship-
ment was later transferred to a train. Unions representing the high-
way drives would sometimes require that an extra fee be paid before
making the transfer. This fee was in addition to compensation for
services actually performed and was supposed to compensate, at least
in part, for loss of the wages members of the union would have earned
had the entire shipment been made by highway carrier. It was to
avoid such union demands that section 40-64.1 was enacted.
The Labor-Management Relations Act has not preempted from
the states power to subject unions to some of the types of regulation
to which other enterprises are subject.160 In National Maritime Union
v. City of Norfolk0 7 it was held that a city might apply its zoning
ordinance to a labor union's hiring hall.
Virginia courts are called upon to decide the usual type of property
questions even though they indirectly relate to internal union affairs.
In Miller v. International Union of United Brewery Workers6 8 the
court, in an injunction suit, had to determine the ownership of prop-
erty as between two unions. The defendant body had seceded from
the parent organization. The court held that a bill to enjoin the
seceders from interfering with the property held by the parent union
stated grounds for equitable relief. On the other hand, the court
held in Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Folkes 69 that, absent
fraud, illegality, or abuse of power, the construction of the rules of
a labor union (as in the case of any other unincorporated association)
is for the appropriate officers of the union and not for the civil
courts. In that case a member sought to enjoin the enforcement of
a compulsory retirement agreement between a local union and an
employer upon the ground that no retirement insurance had been
2
1VA. CODE ANN. § 40-64.1 (Supp. 1966), see Appendix II.
2See Part IV(B) supra.
m=o0 Va. 672, 19 S.E.2d 307 (1961).
"1187 Va. 889, 48 S.E.2d 252 (1948).
202oi Va. 49, 109 S.E.2d 392 (1959).
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contracted for by the employer as required by a declared policy of
the national union. The national organization had been informed of
the agreement between the local and the employer and had approved
it. This action of approval was a construction of the union's policy
by its own officers. The court felt that it should not interfere with
this construction.
VI. Mediation of Labor Disputes
Some states have statutes comparable to the Labor-Management
Relations Act compelling employers to bargain collectively with their
employees (if so desired by the employee) and forbidding unfair labor
practices of the type involved in section 8(a) of the Federal Act.' 70
Virginia has no such statute.171 However, Virginia does have a
limited statute providing for mediation of certain labor disputes.
72
Virginia's mediation statute is important because, under the Labor-
Management Relations Act, 7 3 it is made applicable to some disputes
between employers and employees who are subject to the Federal
Act. That act forbids either party from seeking to terminate or
modify a contract unless notice of such intention be given within 6o
days of the termination date of the contract. Within 3o days the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service must be notified and also
any state agency designated to mediate labor disputes. Such agency
in Virginia is established by statute as the Department of Labor and
Industry.
It must not be assumed that sections 40-95.1 to 40-95.6 apply only
to cases of notification under the Federal Act. It is clear that the
Governor may use the sections in the event of other disputes affecting
the designated public utilities. In fact, the 1966 amendment took
out certain language which might tend to limit Virginia law to
cases not covered by the Federal Act. Since this law provides a gov-
ernmental service more than it imposes control, this writer believes
that the preemption doctrine is not applicable and that the Governor
may invoke the State Act even in cases subject to the federal service.
It is to be noted, however, that the application of Virginia's media-
tion section is limited to public utilities.
17029 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1964).
:,nit is difficult to see much value in such state statutes since the preemption
doctrine prevents their use in most cases. The leading preemption case, Guss v.
Utah Labor Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957), involved an attempt to invoke such a state
labor statute against the employer.
17'VA. CODE ANN. §§ 40-95.1 to -95.6 (Repl. Vol. 1953) (Supp. 1966), see
Appendix II.
17329 U.S.C. § 15 8(d) (1964).
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APPENDIX I
The following table shows the remedy sought in the Virginia cases (and
federal cases involving Virginia law) cited in this article.
Criminal Sanctions
Crump v. Commonwealth, Notes 46, 131
McWhorter v. Commonwealth, Note 93
Edwards v. Commonwealth, Note 125
Dougherty v. Commonwealth, Note 127
Waxman v. Commonwealth, Note 128
Hubbard v. Commonwealth, Notes 94, 130
Civil Suits
Lee v. Virginian Railway Co., Note 34
Employee against employer for alleged contract violation.
Railway Employees v. Virginian Railway, Note 54
Union against company to compel arbitration.
International Brotherhood of Boilermarkers v. Wood, Note 54
Suit by employee, member, against union for alleged insurance benefits.
Yonce v. Miner's Memorial Hospital Ass'n, Note 54
Antitrust suit against trustees.
United Construction Workers v. Laburnum, Notes 55, 88, 89
Company against union for threats of violence.
Kiser v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers,
Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Kiser,
Successive appeals in the same case.
See note 58. Suit by member against union on an indemnity agreement.
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners v. Moore,
Note 58 (same as Kiser)
Pearman v. Industrial Rayon Corp., Notes 66, 69, 71
Employees suit against employer under § 301.
United Constr. Workers v. Haislip Baking Co., Notes 69, 97
Suit by employer under § 3o for wildcat strike.
United Brotherhood v. Humphreys, Note 95
Damage suit for violent injuries by employee against union.
Finney v. Hawkins, Note o2
Right-to-Work action against employer and union.
United Brotherhood v. Moore, Note 119
Suit by employee against union on indemnity contract.
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Vickers, Notes 138, 142
Employee sues union for causing employer to break its contract with
employee.
National Maritime Union v. City of Norfolk, Note 167
Not a damage suit but a declaratory judgment action.
Injunctions
Everett Waddey Co. v. R.T. Union, Notes 61, 118, 121, 146
Local xoi8 v. Rountree, Note 1o3
Local io v. Graham, Notes 104, 154
Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., Note ioo
Miller v. Union of United Brewery, Note 168
Between two unions.
Brotherhood v. Folkes, Note 169
Member against union.
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APPENDIX II
CODE OF VIRGINIA
TITLE 40, CHAPTER 4
LABOR UNIONS, STRIKES, Erc.
ARTICLE 1.
In General.
§ 40-63. Authority of labor unions to own, encumber and sell real estate.-
The trustees of any unincorporated association organized for mutual benefit and
chartered as a labor union for the purpose of collective bargaining and other
lawful functions of labor unions, as defined by the laws of this State, and having
a duly authorized charter as a local labor union, from either a State or national
labor organization, shall have the right to own, possess, improve, sell or mortgage
real estate, not to exceed a total holding of five acres in extent at any one time.
Such real estate can be acquired for any lawful purpose whatsoever.
Property acquired by an unincorporated association under the provisions of
this section can be sold, mortgaged or the title transferred by such trustees in the
same manner and to the same extent as if such trustees were natural persons acting
for themselves in their individual capacity, under the laws of this State.
The provisions of this section shall apply to any real estate acquired prior to
June twenty-seven, nineteen hundred sixty-six, by any such unincorporated asso-
ciation, provided such real estate is real estate that could be legally acquired by
such unincorporated association, if acquired after such date. (1946, p. 565;
Michie Suppl. 1946, § 47a; 1966, c. 382.)
§ 4o-64. Preventing persons from pursuing lawful vocations, etc.; illegal picket-
ing; injunction.-No person shall singly or in concert with others interfere or
attempt to interfere with another in the exercise of his right to work or to enter
upon the performance of any lawful vocation 'by the use of force, threats of viol-
ence or intimidation, or by the use of insulting or threatening language directed
toward such person, to induce or attempt to induce him to quit his employment
or refrain from seeking employment.
No person shall engage in picketing by force or violence, or picket alone or in
concert with others in such manner as to obstruct or interfere with free ingress
or egress to and from any premises, or obstruct or interfere with free use of pub-
lic streets, sidewalks or other public ways.
When a strike or lockout is in progress, no person who is not, or immediately
prior to the time of the commencement of any strike or lockout was not, a bona
fide employee of the business or industry being picketed shall participate in any
picketing or any picketing activity with respect to such strike or lockout.
Any person violating any of the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor, and punished accordingly.
Nothwithstanding the punishments herein provided any court of general equity
jurisdiction may enjoin picketing prohibited by this section, and in addition there-
to, may enjoin any picketing or interference with lawful picketing when necessary
to prevent disorder, restrain coercion, protect life or property, or promote the
general welfare. (1946, p- 392; Michie Suppl. 1946, § 4711a; 1952, c. 674.)
§ 40-64.z Payment of certain charges by carriers or shippers to or for benefit
of labor organization.-(i) As used in this section, the term "labor organization"
means any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation
committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the pur-
pose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.
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(2) It shall be unlawful for any carrier or shipper of property, or any associa-
tion of such carriers or shippers, to agree to pay, or to pay, to or for the benefit
of a labor organization, directly or indirectly, any charge by reason of the placing
upon, delivery to, or movement by rail, or by a railroad car, of a motor vehicle,
trailer, or container which is also capable of being moved or propelled upon the
highways, and any such agreement shall be void and unenforceable.
(3) It shall be unlawful for any labor organization to accept or receive from
any carrier or shipper of property, or any association of such carriers or shippers,
any payment described above.
(4) Any corporation, association, organization, firm or person who agrees to
pay, or who does pay, or who agrees to receive, or who does receive, any payment
described hereinabove shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined not less
than one hundred dollars nor more than one thousand dollars for each offense.
Each act of violation, and each day during which such an agreement remains in
effect, shall constitute a separate offense. (1962, c. 376.)
ARTcLE 2.
Strikes by Government Employees.
§ 4o-65. Employee striking terminates, and becomes temporarily ineligible for,
public employment.-Any employee of the Commonwealth, or of any county, city,
town or other political subdivision thereof, or of any agency of any one of them,
who, in concert with two or more other such employees, for the purpose of
obstructing, impeding or suspending any activity or operation of his employing
agency or any other governmental agency, strikes or willfully refuses to perform
the duties of his employment shall, by such action, be deemed to have terminated
his employment and shall thereafter be ineligible for employment in any position
or capacity during the next twelve months by the Commonwealth, or any county,
city, town or other political subdivision of the State, or by any department or
agency of any of them. (1946, p. 561; Michie Suppl. 1946, § 269 5 h.)
§ 4o-66. Department head, etc., to notify employee of such termination, etc.-
In any such case the head of any department of the State Government, or the
mayor of any city or town, or the chairman of the board of supervisors or other
governing body of any county, or the head of any other such employing agency,
in which such employee was employed, shall forthwith notify such employee of
the fact of the termination of his employment and at the same time serve upon
him in person or by registered mail a declaration of his ineligibility for reemploy-
ment as before provided. Such declaration shall state the facts upon which the
asserted ineligiblity is based. (1946, P. 561; Michie Suppl. 1946, § 2695 h.)
§ 40-67. Appeal by employee from declaration of ineligibility.-In the event
that any such employee feels aggrieved by such declaration of ineligibility he may
within ninety days after the date thereof appeal to the circuit court of the
county or the corporation or hustings court of the city in which he was employed
by filing a petition therein -for a review of the matters of law and fact involved in
or pertinent to the declaration of ineligibility. A copy of the petition shall be
served upon or sent by registered mail to the official signing the declaration, who
may file an answer thereto within ten days after receiving the same. The court or
the judge thereof in vacation shall, as promptly as practicable, hear the appeal
de novo and notify the employee and the signer of the declaration of ineligibility
of the time and place of hearing. The court shall hear such testimony as may be
adduced by the respective parties and render judgment in accordance with the
law and the evidence. Such judgment shall be final. (1946, P. 561; Michie Suppl.
1946, § 2695i.)
ARncL 3.
Denial or Abridgement of Right to Work.
§ 4o-68. Policy of article.-It is hereby declared to be the public policy of
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Virginia that the right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on
account of membership or nonmembership in any labor union or labor organiza-
tion. (1947, p. 12; Michie Suppl. 1948, § 1887(113).)
§ 40-69. Agreements or combinations declared unlawful.-Any agreement or
combination between any employer and any labor union or labor organization
whereby persons not members of such union or organization shall be denied the
right to work for the employer, or whereby such membership is made a condition
of employment or continuation of employment by such employer, or whereby any
such union or organization acquires an employment monopoly in any enterprise,
is hereby declared to be against public policy and an illegal combination or
conspiracy. (1947, p. a2; Michie Suppl. 1948, § 1887(114).)
§ 40-7o . Employers not to require employees to become or remain members
of union.-No person shall be required by an employer to become or remain a
member of any labor union or labor organization as a condition of employment
or continuation of employment by such employer. (1947, p. 12; Michie Suppl.
1948, § 1887(115).)
§ 40-7r. Employers not to require abstention from membership in union.-No
person shall be required by an employer to abstain or refrain from membership in
any labor union or labor organization as a condition of employment or continua-
tion of employment. (1947, p. 12; Michie Suppl. 1948, § 1887(116).)
§ 40-72. Employer not to require payment of union dues, etc.-No employer
shall require any person, as a condition of employment or continuation of em-
ployment, to pay any dues, fees or other charges of any kind to any labor union
or labor organization. (1947, p. 12; Michie Suppl. 1948, § 1887(117).)
§ 40-73. Recovery by individual unlawfully denied employment.-Any person
who may be denied employment or be deprived of continuation of his employment
in violation of §§ 40-70, 40-71 or 40-72 or of one or more of such sections, shall
be entitled to recover from such employer and from any other person, firm,
corporation or association acting in concert with him by appropriate action in the
courts of this Commonwealth such damages as he may have sustained by reason
of such denial or deprivation of employment. (1947, p. 12; Michie Suppl. 1948,
§ 1887(118).)
§ 40-74. Application of article to contracts.-The provisions of this article shall
not apply to any lawful contract in force on April thirtieth, nineteen hundred
and forty-seven, but they shall apply in all respects to contracts entered into there-
after and to any renewal or extension of an existing contract. (1947, P. 12; Michie
Suppl. 1948, § 1887(119).)
§ 40-74.r. Agreement or practice designed to cause employer to violate article
declared illegal.-Any agreement, understanding or practice which is designed to
cause or require any employer, whether or not a party thereto, to violate any pro-
vision of this article is hereby declared to be an illegal agreement, understanding
or practice and contrary to public policy. (1954, c. 431.)
§ 40-74.2 Conduct causing violation of article illegal; peaceful solicitation
to join union.-Any person, firm, association, corporation, or labor union or
organization engaged in lockouts, lay-offs, boycotts, picketing, work stoppages or
other conduct, a purpose of which is to cause, force, persuade or induce any other
person, firm, association, corporation or labor union or organization to violate
any provision of this article shall be guilty of illegal conduct contrary to public
policy; provided that nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent or
make illegal the peaceful and orderly solicitation and persuasion by union mem-
bers of others to join a union, unaccompanied by any intimidation, use of force,
threat of use of force, reprisal or threat of reprisal, and provided that no such
solicitation or persuasion shall be conducted so as to interfere with, or interrupt
the work of any employee during working hours. (1954, c. 431.)
§ 40-74.3. Injunctive relief against violation; recovery of damages.-Any em-
ployer, person, firm, association, corporation, labor union or organization injured
as a result of any violation or threatened violation of any provision of this article
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or threatened with any such violation shall be entitled to injunctive relief against
any and all violators or persons threatening violation, and also to recover from
such violator or violators, or person or persons, any and all damages of any
character cognizable at common law resulting from such violations or threatened
violations. Such remedies shall be independent of and in addition to the penalties
and remedies prescribed in other provisions of this article. (1954, c. 431.)
§ 40-744. Service of process on clerk of State Corporation Commission as
attorney for union.-Any labor union or labor organization doing business in this
State, all of whose officers and trustees are nonresidents of this State, shall by
written power of attorney, filed with the Department of Labor and Industry and
the State Corporation Commission, appoint the clerk of the State Corporation
Commission its attorney or agent upon whom all legal process against the union
or organization may be served, and who shall be authorized to enter an appearance
on its behalf. The manner of service of process on the clerk of the State Corpora-
tion Commission, the mailing thereof to the labor union or organization, the fees
therefor, the effect of judgments, decrees and orders, and the procedure in cases
where no power of attorney is filed as required, shall be the same as provided
for in cases of foreign corporations. (1954, c. 431; 1956, c. 430-)
§ 40-74.5. Violation and penalty.-Any violation of any of the provisions of this
article by any person, firm, association, corporation, or labor union or organization
shall be a misdemeanor and punishable by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars.
Each day of continued violation after conviction shall constitute a separate offense
and shall be punishable as herein provided. (1954, c. 43.)
ARTicLE 5.
Mediation and Conciliation of Labor Disputes.
§ 4o-95.z. Department of Labor and Industry designated agency to mediate
disputes.-The Department of Labor and Industry is hereby designated as the
State agency authorized to mediate and conciliate labor disputes. (1952, c. 697.)
§ 40-95.2. Notice of proposed termination or modification of collective bargain-
ing contract; notice prior to work stoppage.-Whenever there is in effect a col-
lective bargaining contract covering employees of any utility engaged in the
business of furnishing water, light, heat, gas, electric power, transportation or
communication, the utility or the collective bargaining agent recognized by the
utility and its employees shall not terminate or modify such contract until the
party desiring such termination or modification serves written notice upon the
Department of the proposed termination or modification at least thirty days prior
to the expiration date thereof or, in the event such contract contains no expira-
tion date, at least thirty days prior to the date it is proposed to make such termina-
tion or modification, provided, however, that a party having given notice of
modification as provided herein shall not be required to give a notice of termina-
tion of the same contract.
Where there is no collective bargaining contract in effect, the utility or its
employees shall give at least thirty days' notice to the Department prior to any
work stoppage which would affect the operations of the utility engaged in the
business of furnishing any of the utilities as described in this section. (1952, c.
697; 1966, c. 92.)
§ 40-95.3. Commissioner to notify Governor of disputes; mediation and con-
ciliation.-Upon receipt of notice of any labor dispute affecting operation of the
utility, the Commissioner shall forthwith notify the Governor and inform him
of ihe nature of the dispute. If the Governor deems it necessary the Commissioner,
or his designated agent, shall offer to meet and confer with the parties in interest
and undertake to mediate and conciliate their differences. If the Governor deems
it advisable, it shall be the duty of the utility and its employees, or designated
representatives, to meet and confer with the Commissioner or his agent, at a time
and place designated by the Commissioner, for the purpose of mediating and
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conciliating their differences. (1952, c. 697; 1966, c. 92.)
§ 40-954. Commissioner of Labor to keep Governor informed of negotiations,
etc.-The Commissioner of Labor shall keep the Governor fully informed as to
the progress of the negotiations between the utility and its employees and shall
report as soon as practical whether in his judgment a strike or lockout appears
to be probable in any such dispute or, if a strike or lockout begins, whether
continuation thereof is probable. (1952, c. 697.)
§ 40-95.5. Right of entry.-In order to carry out the duties imposed by this
article, the Commissioner of Labor or his designated agent shall have the right
to enter upon the property of the utility. (1952, c. 697.)
§ 4o-95.6. Article not applicable when National Railway Labor Act applies.-
Nothing in this article shall apply to any utility to which the National Railway
Labor Act is applicable. (1952, c. 697.)
ARTIC tE 6.
Registration of Labor Unions, Labor Associations and Labor Organizations.
§ 40-95.7. Triennial registration required; forms; notice of change in officers.-
Every labor union, labor association or labor organization doing business in this
State whether it be an affiliate of an international, national or State labor organiza-
tion or an independent organization, shall register once every three years with the
Department of Labor and Industry not later than forty-five days after January
first of each year registration is required. Registration shall be on forms furnished
by the Department on request and include the following information:
(a) Name of the union, association or organization and business address thereof;
and
(b) Name and address of the principal officer in the State of Virginia or the
registered agent.
In addition to such triennial registration, each such union, association and
organization shall notify the Department in writing within thirty days of any
change in the officers designated on such registration form. (1966, C. 75.)
§ 40.95.8. Failure to register.-Any such union, association or organization fail-
ing to register as required by § 40-95.7 shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon
conviction shall be fined not less than fifty dollars nor more than five hundred
dollars for such violation. Each year the union, association or organization fails
to register shall constitute a separate violation. (1966, c. 75.)
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